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Medical investigation of
suspects by the police
JACK LEE TSEN-TA*
Although medical examinations and samples taken from
suspects’ bodies in the course of police inquiries often lead to
the discovery of important evidence, Singapore criminal
procedure does not appear to empower the police to carry out
such medical investigations. Neither does it safeguard the
interests of suspects. It is submitted that the Criminal
Procedure Code and other statutes should be brought up-to-
date with modern science.
I. INTRODUCTION
On 25 October 1994, Jamil Abdul Hamid spotted a three-year-
old girl playing alone in a playground. He went up to her,
grabbed the gold chain and pendant she was wearing, and ran
off. Chased by the girl’s mother and a stranger, he hid under a
hawker stall counter, but was reported to the police by the stall
owner. When the police arrived, they found that Jamil had
swallowed the evidence. He was arrested and sent to Alexandra
Hospital where, according to the newspaper report, “they
extracted the items from his stomach through his throat. He was
hospitalised [sic] two days.” Jamil pleaded guilty and was
convicted for theft and drug consumption.” Modern medical
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procedures thus enabled the vital evidence in Jamil’s case to be
retrieved without much delay.
Today’s police officer has access to a wide range of
investigation methods to fight crime. A doctor can be requested
to medically examine a suspect and to analyse samples of his
blood, hair, semen and other body fluids and tissues, or
scrapings taken from his fingers, nails and skin.1 Items such as
narcotics which have been concealed in body orifices may be
probed for,2 and things which have been swallowed may be
retrieved by stomach-pumping (passing a tube down the
subject’s throat), or administering emetics to induce vomiting
and enemas to cause evacuation of the bowels.
These techniques are all available in Singapore. The police
routinely escort suspects to hospitals for medical investigations
to be carried out. The Ministry of Health’s Institute of Science
and Forensic Medicine (ISFM) was formed on 1 April 1990, and
two of its Divisions assist the police. The Forensic Science
Division has a Criminalistics Laboratory which examines
physical evidence, including blood traces. This Division also has
a Forensic Biology/DNA Laboratory which analyses body fluids
and stains in police exhibits. It set up a DNA profiling service in
1991.3 Among other things, the Division’s Narcotics and
1
2
3
See, generally, Indian Law Institute, Self-Incrimination: Physical and
Medical Examination of the Accused (1963); Law Reform Commission of
Canada, Investigative Tests (Working Paper 34, 1984); Tan Yock Lin,
Criminal Procedure (1996) at para V [604-752].
R v Brezack (1949) 96 CCC 97 (CA, Ontario) (mouth); Reynen v
Antonenko (1975) 20 CCC (2d) 342 (SC, Alberta) (rectum). During a
debate in the UK House of Commons on the Police and Criminal Evidence
Bill, an actual case of a razor blade hidden in the vagina was cited: see
David Wolchover, The Exclusion of Improperly Obtained Evidence: With
Special Reference to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1986) at 228.
The probability that two unrelated individuals have the same DNA profile
is claimed to be tens or even hundreds of millions to one: Andrew Hall,
“DNA Fingerprints–Black Box or Black Hole?” (1990) 140 New LJ 203
col 1. On the techniques and shortcomings of DNA profiling, see Tan Ken
Hwee, “Developments in Genetics: How Will the Law Cope?” (1993) 14
Sing LR 293 at 313-19; “The Art of Genetic Fingerprinting”, The Straits
Times, 3 May 1994 at 19; and ST Chow, TL Ng & TC Chao, “Forensic
Applications of DNA Profiling” (1996) 25 Ann Acad Med S’pore 103.
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Toxicology Laboratories test blood and urine samples for traces
of alcohol and drugs. The Clinical Forensic Medicine Division
has also used DNA profiling to investigate disputed paternity in
alleged rape cases. Forensic biology and science expertise are
continually being developed to support police investigations and
prosecutions.4
The results of medical investigations may have important
evidentiary uses.5 On the other hand, some techniques are not
merely embarrassing but highly invasive and painful. They carry
risks to suspects’ health. If not performed properly, samples can
become contaminated and yield false results. Unfortunately,
while many Acts authorise the “search” of persons,6 none state
whether this includes medical investigations. The Criminal
Procedure Code7 itself at best says little about the use of forensic
techniques in criminal investigations. Furthermore, even certain
penal statutes8 which explicitly empower police officers to
conduct medical examinations and take body samples for
4
5
6
7
8
DNA profiling has been used in criminal cases in Singapore for some
years now: Chow, Ng & Chao.
Institute of Science and Forensic Medicine, Ministry of Health, Annual
Report 1993 at 23-27, 47, 84-85.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra, n 1 at 21-41, lists no less
than 11 different ways in which the use of investigative tests may yield
incriminating evidence.
In particular, the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Cap 67), s
14; the National Registration Act (Cap 201, 1992 Ed), s 16(2)(b); and
Singapore Armed Forces Act (Cap 295), s 172(1). See also the Arms and
Explosives Act (Cap 13), s 38; Civil Defence Act (Cap 42), s 67;
Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act (Cap
65), s 9; Internal Security Act (Cap 143), s 66(1); Intoxicating Substances
Act (Cap 146A), s 8(1); Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185), ss 24(1 )(b) and
26(l)(b); and Women’s Charter (Cap 353), s 173(1). This list is not
exhaustive. All Acts are of the 1985 Rev Ed unless otherwise stated.
(Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed); hereinafter referred to as “CPC”.
Eg Civil Defence Act (Cap 42, 1985 Rev Ed), s 65 (general physical
examination); Intoxicating Substances Act (Cap 146A, 1988 Ed), s 13
(blood sample); Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 1985 Rev Ed), ss 31
(urine sample) and 37 (medical examination); Road Traffic Act (Cap 276,
1994 Ed), ss 69(1) (blood and urine samples) and 71(1) (breath sample).
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specific purposes do not contain sufficient guidelines and
safeguards. It is a sobering thought that procedures with scope
for abuse by overzealous police officers remain unregulated.
This article highlights the shortcomings of our criminal
procedure in this respect. A conceptual framework for the issue
is proposed, and the current state of law examined to see if it
conforms to it. Finally, basic legislative reforms are proposed to
update the law to suit modern circumstances.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL POSITION
A. A Conceptual Framework9
Two interests compete when we consider what the proper scope
of police powers to conduct medical investigations should be.10
To ensure the community’s safety, there is a public interest in
promoting the efficient detection of crime by the police and the
punishment of offenders. This must be balanced against the
public interest in preventing unfair and inhumane treatment of
suspects. It is important to recognise that the two interests
involved are both public interests. In principle, this is more
satisfactory than saying the exercise of police powers depends
on a balance between the rights of individuals and the needs of
society.11
The public interest in protecting suspects involves making sure
that their personal interests are only outweighed in defined
circumstances and on good grounds. Although these personal
interests are neither expressly stated in the Constitution nor in
9
10
11
See, generally, David Feldman, The Law Relating to Entry, Search and
Seizure (1986) at 15-21.
See People v O’Brien [1965] IR 142 (SC, Ireland) and R v Ireland [1970]
ALR 727 at 735 (HC, Australia).
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Obtaining Forensic
Evidence: Investigative Procedures in Respect of the Person (Report 25,
1985) at 3.
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any Act of Parliament,12 we cannot conclude that a suspect has
no relevant interests that the law should protect. It is submitted
that as a matter of common sense the law should recognise at
least three distinct personal interests: bodily integrity, dignity
and privacy.
In the other pan of the scale lies the public interest in keeping
the streets safe. Section 8 of the Police Force Act (Cap 235, 1985
Rev Ed) tells us: “The Police Force shall... be employed in and
throughout Singapore for the maintenance of law and order, the
preservation of the public peace, the prevention and detection of
crime and the apprehension of offenders.” Specific duties of the
Police Force are detailed in section 38, which again includes (at
sub-section (b)) the taking of lawful measures for “preventing
and detecting crimes and offences”. These are uncontroversial
provisions. But the concern expressed over the recent Somporn
Chinphakdee case13 shows that the public is disturbed by the
possibility of police brutality in the pursuance of these aims.
Somporn, a Thai employed in Singapore, was charged with the
murder of a fellow worker but acquitted without his defence
being called because of insufficient evidence to form a prima
facie case against him. The High Court found that there was
evidence to support Somporn’s allegations of having been
assaulted by the police during interrogation. In particular,
Somporn’s allegation that his upper left arm had been pricked
with a sharp object was apparently borne out by an X-ray which
revealed the presence of a broken sewing needle under the skin.
12
13
The most relevant provision in the Singapore Constitution is Art 9(1): “No
person shall be deprived of... personal liberty save in accordance with
law.” Cf the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 8: “Everyone has
the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure”; United
States Constitution, 4th Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure
in their persons... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated...”
PP v Somporn Chinphakdee [1995] 1 CLAS News 288 (HC), upheld on
appeal in PP v Somporn Chinphakdee, Criminal Appeal No 29 of 1994,
25 October 1994 (CA) (available in the NUS Law Library’s collection of
unreported judgments, Singapore Court of Criminal Appeal Judgments,
vol 7).
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The court held that since his fear of being assaulted had not been
sufficiently removed when he made certain statements to the
police, these statements were inadmissible. The decision in this
case led to calls from the public14 and Members of Parliament15
for a review of police procedures and the institution of more
protection for suspects against police brutality. Although
Somporn eventually pleaded guilty to perjury, the needle in his
arm apparently a “charm needle” inserted in the belief that it
would give him strength or luck,16 the case shows that there is
14
15
16
Wilfred Ong Chiew Leng, “Courts Must Be Vigilant Against Ill-Treatment
of Accused Persons”; Andrew Mak Yen-Chen, “Probe Thai’s Allegations
Against the Police”, The Straits Times, 12 August 1994 at 37; Lee Yew
Moon, “Police Must Probe Their Own Conduct”, The Straits Times, 30
September 1994 at 34.
“No Black Sheep Allowed to Tarnish Integrity of Ministry”, The Straits
Times, 26 August 1994 at 28. NMP Ton Keng Kiat suggested that the
Independent Investigation Section, which looks into allegations of police
wrongdoing, be made independent of the police. MP Low Thia Kiang
(Hougang) proposed that all statements to the police be taped, while NMP
Chia Shi Teck felt that taping should at least be carried out in capital
cases. NMP Kanwaljit Soin suggested that suspects be medically
examined 24 to 48 hours after interrogation as bruises take time to show
up. None of these suggestions were taken up. According to the Ministry of
Home Affairs, the police reviewed its investigation procedures following
the Somporn Chinphakdee case and found “no flaws or inadequacies”. It
rejected proposals for independent investigators, stating that the
Commissioner of Police should have the power to discipline his own men.
Taping of interviews was rejected on the ground that accused persons
could still allege they had been threatened before the taping. Lastly, Dr
Soin’s suggestion was rejected on the ground that the time lapse between
interrogation and medical examination could lead to other allegations
against the police. However, the Ministry pointed out that doctors can re-
examine accused persons one or two days later if they need to: “Somporn
Case: No Need to Revise Probe Procedure”, The Straits Times, 2 March
1995 at 18.
After his acquittal of murder, Somporn was charged with overstaying in
Singapore and with perjury. He pleaded guilty to the first charge and was
sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane, but
claimed trial to the second one: “Acquitted Thai on Fresh Charges”, The
Straits Times, 6 October 1994 at 3; “Perjury Trial Will Not Affect Thai
Worker’s Acquittal”, The Straits Times, 8 October 1994 at 28; “He Claims
Trial to Giving False Evidence”, The Straits Times, 24 November 1994 at
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strong public opinion that the police must not be allowed to ill-
treat suspects to obtain evidence to convict them. If the police
force disregards such opinion, it may lose legitimacy and suffer
a fall in support and co-operation from members of the
community.17 This would certainly be against the public
interest.
With this conceptual framework in mind, two principles should
guide us as we formulate rules for the conduct of medical
investigations:
(1)
(2)
The law should not unduly hinder the police in their duties
of crime detection and prevention. Police officers should
therefore have reasonable powers to medically examine
suspects and take samples from their bodies.
But to safeguard the public interest in ensuring that suspects
are treated fairly and humanely, laws should minimise
invasions on bodily integrity, dignity and privacy. The law
should also strive to deter the police from extracting
evidence from suspects through unsavoury methods.
17
25. Finally, on 2 February 1995, Somporn pleaded guilty to having lied
that police interrogators had stuck a needle into his arm to extract his
murder confession. According to forensic experts, the needle was too
deeply embedded into his soft tissue to have been recently inserted. It was
also too short to have been held between the fingers and poked so deeply
into his arm. The straight alignment of the breaks in the needle indicated
that the needle had corroded inside the body and had broken due to the
movement of arm muscles–this would have taken years to happen. The
most telling fact was that Somporn had four needles in his body, one in
each limb. Charm needles are usually inserted into the body
symmetrically, several at a time: “Thai Worker Jailed Five Years for
Making Up False Evidence”, The Straits Times, 3 February 1995 at 3.
Feldman, supra, n 9 at 227 para 9.02: “Most policemen recognise that
excessive zeal in conducting personal searches is seen from the other side
as insensitive bullying, and leads to a loss of co-operation and loss of
support for the police.” See also Lord Scarman’s report in The Brixton
Disorders, 10-12 April 1981 (Cmnd 8427, 1981), especially paras
4 . 1 - 4 . 4 ,  4 . 5 5 - 4 . 5 8 ,  5 . 7 6 .
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B. Inadequacy of Criminal Procedure in Singapore
Many forensic techniques used today were not available or
sufficiently developed until recent times. Because our main
source of criminal procedure, the Criminal Procedure Code, was
modelled on the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure 1898,18 it is
not suited to deal with new technologies.
1. Before arrest
The inviolability of a person’s property was jealously guarded
by the common law. Semayne’s Case19 stated: “The house of
everyone is to him as his castle and fortress.” This was later
rephrased more emphatically by William Pitt, 18th century
Prime Minister of England: “The poorest man may in his cottage
bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail–its
roof may shake–the winds may blow through it–the storm may
enter–but the King of England cannot enter–all his force dares
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.”
A person’s bodily integrity was treated similarly. Chisholm J
in R v Ella Paint20 said: “At common law the dwelling of the
subject is held to be immune from intrusion, unless there is
express authority to justify the intrusion, and the ‘person’ of the
subject is held equally sacred.” In the context of medical
investigations, it was specifically declared by the New Zealand
Criminal Law Reform Committee in 1978 that “[a]t common
law there is no power to compel... a subject who has not been
arrested... to provide a sample of his blood, hair, saliva, or other
bodily matter. Any use of physical force to obtain such a sample
18
19
20
Act V of 1898, later amended and re-enacted as the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973 (Act II of 1974). See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “Of
Codes and Ideology: Some Notes on the Origins of the Major Criminal
Enactments of Singapore” (1989) 31 Mal LR 46 at 66. On the codification
of criminal procedure in India, see MP Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal
History (3rd ed, 1972) at 569-70; AR Biswas, BB Mitra on the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act II of 1974) (15th ed, 1978) vol 1 at 16.
(1604) 5 Co Rep 91a, 77 ER 194.
(1917) 28 CCC 171 at 174 (SC, Nova Scotia).
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by the police or by a doctor at their behest would constitute an
assault.”2l
Lord Denning MR affirmed this point in Ghani v Jones,22
stating that, in general, if no one has been arrested or charged,
the common law does not permit police officers or anyone else
to search a suspect’s person without his consent simply to see if
he may have committed some crime or other. But because of the
need to balance the freedom of the individual against the interest
of society in finding out wrongdoers and repressing crime, he
held it was permissible to search suspects and seize articles from
them prior to arrest, provided certain requirements are
satisfied.23 Broadly speaking, the police may search and seize if
they have reasonable grounds for believing that the suspect has
committed a serious offence and that the articles seized are
material evidence. While Lord Denning’s requirements were
clearly not tailored for medical investigations, it is possible for a
court to discover in them certain basic principles which would
justify conducting such procedures before the suspect’s arrest.
The position under the CPC differs from common law, as it
corresponds to the Indian Code which does not empower police
officers to search persons before arrest. In Ramain Rai v
21
22
23
New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee, Bodily Examination and
Samples as a Means of Identification (1979) at 4 para 9, quoted in J
Hannan, “New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee on Bodily
Samples and Identification” (1980) 4 Crim LJ 210. See also Charles
Wegg-Prosser, The Police and the Law (2nd ed, 1979) at 59: “At common
law there is no general power before arresting a person to search him and
to seize his property without his consent or without the authority of a
warrant. A police officer searching a person without his consent or
without authority may be committing an assault and could be liable in a
civil action for damages for trespass to the person.”; and John Bishop,
Criminal Procedure (1983) at 64: “There is no general power at common
law... enabling a policeman to ‘stop and frisk’ a person and seize property
in his possession, or to require of the person that he undergo a physical
examination, unless the person is first arrested. The exercise of these
powers necessarily involves detention which, except where consent is
given, is forbidden at common law.”
[1969] 3 All ER 1700 at 1703G (CA). Edmund-Davies LJ and Sir Gordon
Willmer agreed.
Ibid at 1705E-G.
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Emperor,24 a police sub-inspector accosted the applicant whom
he suspected of having in his bag some papers “connected with
the Congress”. When the applicant refused to be searched, the
sub-inspector tried to remove the bag forcibly. The applicant
grabbed the sub-inspector’s hand, but the sub-inspector threw
him to the ground and beat him up. Despite this, the applicant
was charged with using criminal force to deter a public servant
from the discharge of his duty. At no time did the sub-inspector
try to arrest him. The court held that the police had obviously no
authority at law to search the person of the applicant. The only
provision which allowed a police officer to search a person was
section 51 of the Indian Code (CPC section 29(1)) which applied
only after a person had been arrested.
This case aside, several provisions seem capable on their face
of authorising medical investigations before arrest. These will
now be considered.
(1) Search of persons: CPC section 26; Criminal Law (Temporary
Provisions) Act, section 14(1): It is convenient to deal with these
two provisions together. Section 26 of the CPC, which has no
Indian counterpart, empowers any person conducting a lawful
search of any house or place in respect of any offence to detain
all persons found in it until the search is completed, and if the
thing sought is in its nature capable of being concealed on the
person, those persons may be searched for it by or in the
presence of a Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, or police officer
not below the rank of sergeant.25 There is no prerequisite for the
24
25
AIR 1942 A11424.
This changes the common law position. At common law, while people
may be found on premises they do not form part of the real estate and so
are not subject to a search warrant covering the premises: see James A
Fontana, The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada (3rd ed, 1992) at 613;
William C Hodge, Doyle and Hodge: Criminal Procedure in New Zealand
(3rd ed, 1991) at 59. Harris J in R v Ella Paint, supra, n 20 at 175, said
that “In prosecuting his search, the [Canadian] statute enables the
constable to break down doors, locks, closets, cupboards, etc. But nothing
is said about searching the ‘persons’ of the occupants. If it were
contemplated to authorise so unusual a proceeding, one would expect the
legislature to say so definitely and precisely; for to search the person of
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person to be arrested first. Section 14(1) of the Criminal Law
(Temporary Provisions) Act26 is wider as a search of premises is
not a condition precedent. Under section 14(1), a police officer
not below the rank of sergeant may, without warrant and with or
without assistance, stop and search any individual, whether in a
public place or not, if he suspects that any evidence of the
commission of an offence is likely to be found on the individual.
The police officer may seize any evidence found.
Unfortunately, both these provisions are silent about the
permissible scope of the search. On a plain reading, the police
are clearly allowed to frisk the suspect. But are they empowered
to order him to strip, to probe his body orifices or retrieve
swallowed items? At any rate, it is submitted that the phrases
“thing... in its nature capable of being concealed on the person”
and “evidence... found on the individual” cannot include tissue
and fluid samples from a suspect’s body.27
(2) Search warrants: CPC section 61(1)(c): Section 61(1)(c) of the
CPC authorises a court to issue a search warrant if it considers
that the purposes of justice or any inquiry, trial or other
proceeding under the CPC will be served by a general search or
inspection. However, section 61 only contemplates the issue of
warrants for the search of premises. This is clear from Form 8 of
Schedule B to the CPC, which requires the judge issuing the
warrant to “describe the house or part thereof, to which the
26
27
the occupant is pushing farther the invasion of one’s privacy than breaking
open a door or closet.”
(Cap 67,1985 Rev Ed); hereinafter referred to as “CLIPA”.
Tan Yock Lin, supra, n 1 at paras IV [801-2] and VI [801], suggests that
notwithstanding the invasion or intrusion of the accused’s body, s 26 of
the CPC arguably authorises the police to search the accused to remove
objects concealed in body orifices, and to require an accused to disgorge
swallowed items. This is because the concealment necessitates the search.
However, he says that it cannot be right to argue that the taking of a blood
or urine sample is within the ordinary meaning of a search of the person.
In such cases, there can be no search since there is no concealment.
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search is to be confined”. Section 61(1)(c) cannot, therefore,
authorise the police to medically investigate suspects.28
(3) Procedure where seizable offence suspected: CPC section 119(1):
This section states:
If from information received or otherwise a police officer has
reason to suspect the commission of a seizable offence he shall
forthwith proceed in person or shall depute one of his
subordinate officers to proceed to the spot to investigate the
facts and circumstances of the case and to take such measures
as may be necessary for the discovery and, where not
inexpedient, arrest of the offender and shall report the same to
the Public Prosecutor. [Emphasis added.]
In Deoman Shamji Patil v The State,29 the accused resisted the
police’s attempt to take him to a dispensary for a doctor’s
examination. The prosecution argued that a power to submit the
accused to a medical examination was impliedly conferred on
the police by section 157 of the Indian Code, which is in pari
materia with CPC section 119(1). This was rejected by
Tarkunde J:
The short answer to this rather specious argument is that
section 157 of the Code lays down some of the duties, and
none of the rights, of an officer in charge of a police station.
That section has no relevance... to the consideration of the
extent to which a police officer can act in curtailment of the
rights of a subject as regards his person or his property...
The learned judge also pointed out that the legislature had
enacted in the Code specific provisions limiting the rights and
liberties of suspects where necessary for criminal investigations.
If investigating officers had overriding powers under section
157, all these sections would be redundant.
28
29
Contrast Tan Yock Lin, ibid at para IV [903]: “[A]n argument could be
made that section 61(1)(c)... can be the foundation of a search warrant
authorising intimate search.”
AIR 1959 Bom 284.
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(4) Summons to produce, and search by police officer during
investigation: CPC sections 58(1) and 125(1): Section 58(1) of the
CPC provides:
Whenever any court or police officer considers that the
production of any document or other thing is necessary or
desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or
other proceeding under this Code by or before that court or
police officer, such court may issue a summons or such officer
a written order to the person in whose possession or power the
document or thing is believed to be requiring him to attend
and produce it or to produce it at the time and place stated in
the summons or order. [Emphasis added.]
It is submitted that this section does not empower the police to
have suspects medically investigated. The words “in whose
possession or power the ... thing is believed to be” are clearly
inept to refer to items which have been swallowed or hidden in
body orifices, much less the suspect’s own body or samples from
it. Furthermore, the title of Chapter VI,30 in which section 58
appears, reads: “Processes to compel the production of
documents and other movable property...” The legislature could
not have had medical investigations in mind.
It might also be contended that the police can rely on section
125 while conducting investigations into seizable offences:
Whenever a police officer making a police investigation in a
seizable case considers that the production of any document or
other thing is necessary to the conduct of an investigation into
30 Section 2 of the CPC states that “the marginal notes of this Code shall not
affect the construction thereof.” Arguably, headings and titles are
excluded. Besides, this rule of construction is now inconsistent with and
may be considered impliedly repealed by s 9A(3)(a) of the Interpretation
Act (Cap 1, 1985 Rev Ed) which permits judges to consider “all matters
not forming part of the written law that are set out in the document
containing the text of the written law as printed by the Government
Printer.” See also PP v Huntsman [1966] 1 MLJ 93 at 94 col 21 (HC,
Ipoh) and R v Schildkamp [1971] AC 1 at 27 (HL). However, due account
should be taken of the fact that a heading merely serves as a brief, and
therefore necessarily inaccurate, guide to material to which it is attached:
FAR Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code (2nd ed, 1992) at 510-11
8255.
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any offence which he is authorised to investigate and there is
reason to believe that a person to whom a summons or order
under section 58 has been or might be issued will not or would
not produce the document or other thing as directed in the
summons or order or when the document or other thing is not
known to be in the possession of any person, the officer may
search or cause a search for it to be made in any place.
[Emphasis added.]
This argument is untenable. Firstly, section 125(1) makes
reference to section 58 which is probably inapplicable.
Secondly, section 125(4) makes provisions relating to search
warrants, so far as may be, applicable to a section 125(1) search.
We have already seen that a search warrant probably cannot be
issued to authorise the search of a person’s body. Finally, the
decision of Re Laporte and the Queen31 pointed out that in the
context of the Canadian Criminal Code a person’s body cannot
fall within the word place, which is a geographic and not an
anatomical location.32 In a strongly-worded judgment, Hugessen
J wrote:
Words much plainer than those would be required to convince
me that Parliament intended in this section to authorise the
breaking open of the human frame by means of a search
warrant... [I]f the police are today to be authorised to probe
into a man’s shoulder for evidence against him, what is to
prevent them tomorrow from opening his brain or other vital
organs for the same purpose. The investigation of crime would
no doubt be thereby rendered easier, but I do not think that we
can, in the name of efficiency, justify the wholesale mutilation
of suspected persons.33
31
32
33
(1972) 8 CCC (2d) 343 (QB, Quebec).
That the word does not refer to a part of the body is supported by s 2 of
the CPC, which defines place as including a house, building, tent and
vessel.
Supra, n 31 at 353.
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2. After arrest
The early case of R v Boulton34 held that a judge or magistrate
only had power to order an examination of a prisoner’s person
with his or her consent. Once consent was obtained, even if such
consent was given only because the prisoner was mistaken about
the judge’s power to make such an order, the examination was
valid. But if in pursuance of an order an examination was made
without consent, those who made the order and those who
carried out the examination were guilty of criminal assault.
Boulton therefore suggests that at the time there was no general
right at common law to search an accused person after arrest.
However, this rule became hedged with exceptions. Later cases
established that arrested persons could be searched (removing
clothing if necessary)35 for specific items such as weapons
which could be used to injure themselves or others,36
implements which they could use to escape with, or evidence
material to the offence they were charged with, if there were
reasonable grounds for believing they had such items on them.37
In appropriate circumstances items could be removed with
reasonable force but without resorting to unnecessary
violence.38
These exceptions have cumulatively diplaced the original rule.
Today, at common law there may be a general right to search
34
35
36
37
38
(1871) 12 Cox CC 87 at 91. See Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed,
1976) vol 11 para 1267; this area of the law is now governed by the UK
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
Gottschalk v Hutton (1921) 36 CCC 298 (CA, Alberta).
Leigh v Cole (1853) 6 Cox CC 329.
R v O’Donnell (1835) 7 C & P 138, 173 ER 61; R v Burgiss (1836) 7 C &
P 488, 173 ER 217; Bessell v Wilson (1853) 20 LT(OS) 233n, quoted with
approval in Lindley v Rutter [1980] 3 WLR 660; Tyler & Witt v London &
South West Railway Co (1884) Cab & El 285, 15(1) Digest (2nd Reissue,
1993) 132 case 12733; Dillon v O’Brien & Davis (1887) 16 Cox CC 245;
Gordon v Denison (1895) 22 OAR 315; Gottschalk v Mutton, supra, n 34;
Field v Sullivan [1923] VLR 70; Elias v Pasmore [1934] 2 KB 164.
Dillon v O’Brien, ibid
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arrested persons. In Dallison v Caf fery ,39 Lord Denning MR was
of the view that:
When a constable has taken into custody a person reasonably
suspected of a felony, he can do what is reasonable to
investigate the matter, and to see whether the suspicions are
supported or not by further evidence... So long as such
measures are taken reasonably, they are an important adjunct
to the administration of justice; by which I mean, of course,
justice not only to the man himself but also to the community
at large.
This case establishes that modern police officers possess a power
to take reasonable steps to investigate whether persons in their
custody have committed offences. It has been suggested that
since the common law supposedly embodies common sense and
humanity, procedures which are sensible and prudent in the
circumstances include conducting a strip search for small items
of jewellery which can be hidden on the person, or taking
fingernail scrapings if handling explosives is suspected.40 This is
confirmed by Canadian decisions. For instance, Reynen v
Antonenko affirms that “[t]here is a general power to search on
arrest.”41 The court found that a non-consensual search of the
plaintiff’s rectum for drugs conducted by a doctor did not
constitute assault and battery:
In making this search and seizure the police are clearly
authorised to use such force as is reasonable, proper and
necessary to carry out their duty, providing that no wanton or
unnecessary violence is imposed. It is also clear that what is
reasonable and proper in any particular case will depend on all
the circumstances of that particular case, it being impossible to
39
40
41
[1964] 2 All ER 610 at 617B-D (CA). Lord Denning MR cited the
following examples of reasonable measures taken to investigate crimes:
taking the arrested person to his house to search for stolen property, taking
the person to a place to confirm or refute an alibi, and putting the person
up on an identification parade to see if he is picked out by witnesses.
Wolchover, supra, n 2 at 230.
(1975) 20 CCC (2d) 342 at 346 (SC, Alberta).
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lay down any hard and fast rule to be applied to all cases,
except the test of reasonableness.42
In R v Brezack,43 the accused was arrested in public on suspicion
of illegal possession of narcotics. Several police officers pinned
him down while another officer caught his throat to prevent him
from swallowing. After applying a great deal of force, the officer
inserted his fingers into the accused person’s mouth to search for
drugs. None were found, but the officer’s fingers were bitten in
the process. The accused was charged with assault. The court
found that the attempted mouth search was a justifiable incident
of his arrest.
However, there are also arguments that common law does not
justify non-consensual invasive procedures. It has been
contended that procedures such as orifice searches are so
degrading that the common law may prefer to accept the risk of
evidence being undetected or destroyed, or the fairly remote
chance that a weapon concealed in an orifice may be used, than
to subject possibly innocent people to such humiliation. Also,
does the common law sanction a procedure which is hazardous
to health if done by a layman, but is in breach of medical ethics
if performed by a doctor without the patient’s consent?44 In
McAneny v Kearney, ex parte Kearney,45 Stable J (with whom
Sherman J agreed) concluded that section 25.9 of the Queensland
Criminal Code, which authorises the examination of persons in
custody where there are reasonable grounds for believing that
such examination will afford evidence as to the commission of
an offence, was, “so far as my research carries me, not an
expression of common law”. He thus implied that the common
law does not require arrested or suspected persons to submit to
medical examination without consent.46
42
43
44
45
46
Ibid at 348 per MacDonald J.
(1949) 96 CCC 97 (CA, Ontario).
Wolchover, supra, n 2 at 231.
[1966] Qd R 306 at 311 (Full Ct, Queensland).
Law Reform Commission, Criminal Investigation (Report No 2 (Interim),
1975) at para 130 (Australian Commonwealth).
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It is evident that different jurisdictions have developed the
common law to different extents. Canadian courts have asserted
the right of police to conduct even the forced probing of a
person’s orifices, while their British counterparts have only
made general statements which may or may not imply a right to
conduct physical examinations and take body samples from
arrested persons. In Australia such procedures were stated to be
unauthorised by the common law. But there appears to be a point
beyond which the common law will not go. In Laporte the
police, suspecting that the accused was the perpetrator of a bank
robbery in which the robber had been wounded by police
gunfire, obtained a search warrant authorising a surgical search
of his body for bullets. The accused applied successfully for
certiorari to quash the warrant. Hugessen J accepted that there is
a common law right of search incidental to arrest, but continued:
It is not necessary to decide whether the common-law right of
search might extend as far as minor medical procedures such
as the taking of a blood test or examination by X-rays, but I
can find nothing in the cases which would justify a surgical
intrusion into the body of a prisoner many months after his
arrest for the purpose of obtaining evidence against him on a
charge other than that for which he is being held. ... In my
view the Justice had no jurisdiction, either by statute or at
common law, to issue this warrant, and it is my duty to
interfere and prevent what I can only describe as a grotesque
perversion of the machinery of justice and an unwarranted
invasion upon the basic inviolability of the human person.47
47 Supra, n 31 at 350, 354. See also Rochin v California (1952) 342 US 165
(stomach-pumping for narcotic capsules). In the Singapore case of
Somporn Chinphakdee, earlier mentioned in greater detail, the defendant
Somporn was charged with having perjured himself by alleging that police
interrogators stuck a needle into his arm to extract a murder confession.
While X-rays showed that there was indeed a needle in Somporn’s arm, it
was apparently one of four “charm needles” inserted into his body to bring
him strength or luck. Somporn refused consent for the needles to be
surgically removed. The Deputy Public Prosecutor applied to the court to
have the refusal verified, stating inter alia that the needles constituted
important evidence relating to the charges; therefore, it was in the interests
of justice to remove them for use as exhibits. District Judge S
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Could our courts choose to follow the liberal Canadian position
if they were so minded? In Singapore, the police’s power to
search arrested persons is regulated by CPC section 29:
29(1). Whenever a person is arrested... the police officer
making the arrest... may search such person and place in
custody all articles other than necessary wearing apparel found
upon him and any of those articles which there is reason to
believe were the instruments or the fruits or other evidences of
the crime may be detained until his discharge or acquittal.48
The issue is how widely the word search should be interpreted.
In the Indian decision Bhondar v Emperor49 a 15-year-old boy
was accused of raping a girl aged nine. A medical examination,
conducted without his consent, revealed that he had suffered
injuries to his penis consistent with a rape. The court upheld the
jury’s acquittal of the boy on the basis of other evidence. In the
course of their decision, the judges stressed that the police had
no legal right under section 51 (CPC section 29(1)) to forcibly
take hold of the accused and have his body medically examined
without his consent. As Lort-Williams J put it:
I am quite satisfied that the police are not entitled without
statutory authority to commit assaults upon prisoners for the
purpose of procuring evidence against them. If the legislature
desires that evidence of this kind should be given, it will be
quite simple to add a short section to the Code of Criminal
48
49
Thiyagarajan confirmed by questioning Somporn that he did not consent
to the removal of the needles and made no order for their removal: “Thai
Refuses to Have Needles in Body Removed”, The Straits Times, 13
October 1994 at 25.
It is fairly obvious that CPC ss 29(1) and 30 (which empowers police
officers to seize offensive weapons from arrested persons) were modelled
on the common law.
AIR 1931 Cal 601, approved by Deoman Shamji Patil v The State, supra,
n 28 (police have no legal right to take an accused person by force to a
doctor to examine whether he is intoxicated). See also Subayya Gounder v
Bhoopala Subramanian AIR 1959 Mad 396 and, generally, SC Sarkar,
The Law of Criminal Procedure (Prabhas C Sarkar & Kshitis C Ray eds,
5th ed, 1984) at 55-56.
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Procedure expressly giving power to order such a medical
examination.50
Of course, a medical examination may be lawfully conducted if
the arrested person consents to it.51
There is a case which reached the opposite conclusion. In Re
Palani Goundan,52 the court examined the privilege against self-
incrimination embodied in Article 20(3) of the Indian
Constitution and held that while an accused may refuse to
volunteer evidence, the police is not prohibited from searching
him for it and seizing it. Accordingly, the court concluded that
an accused person can be taken to a doctor to be examined for
injuries to ascertain whether he has participated in an offence, or
to have stolen property which he has swallowed removed.
However, the court failed to discuss which provision of the CPC
empowers the police to carry out such procedures. It is therefore
submitted that this case must be viewed with suspicion.
3. Assessment
The rules of Singapore criminal procedure were not framed with
the medical investigation of suspects in mind. The most relevant
provisions, sections 26 and 29(1) of the CPC and section 14(1)
of the CLTPA, clearly permit the searching of clothing, and
possibly an examination of the suspect’s naked body and the
taking of residues from the skin. But there is nothing explicit
about whether probing of body orifices, retrieval of swallowed
objects or the taking of tissue or fluid samples is allowed. It is
submitted that to interpret the CPC as authorising such
procedures, following the Canadian position, would stretch its
50
51
52
Ibid at 602. See also 604 per Ghose J. Ghose J was not prepared to go so
far as to say that mere absence of consent would constitute a criminal
assault under the Penal Code. On the other hand, Lort-Williams J felt that
any such examination would amount to an assault, but it is possible that he
meant “assault” in the sense of the tort of trespass to the person.
Hanuman Sarma v Emperor AIR 1932 Cal 723. Oral assent suffices
(Hanuman Sarma, ibid at 725), although consent in writing is preferable
(Bhondar, supra, n 49 at 604).
AIR 1957 Mad 546.
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wording too far. It is also unwise for the court to widen the
scope of the CPC through liberal interpretation since it is
extremely difficult for judges to lay down and enforce the
detailed safeguards which are needed.
The law today puts the police in a quandary. The police act
illegally53 if they conduct medical procedures on suspects
without their consent, or procure consent by force or fraud. The
mere fact that the Singapore Police Force may have internal
guidelines54 on how the procedures should be conducted does
not legitimise them. If there is no consent, carrying them out
remains contrary to general law. Besides, internal guidelines are
unsatisfactory because only police officers will know if they are
being followed. The possibility of abuse is high. The police may
seek to circumvent these difficulties by exercising powers under
other legislation in a way not contemplated by Parliament. For
instance, they might try to obtain a blood sample from a suspect
under the provisions of the Road Traffic Act even though the
case does not involve a driving offence. Such action would be
ultra vires the Act and unlawful. The Code thus stands in dire
need of revision.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The power of police to carry out medical investigations on
suspects has been considered by law reform commissions in
53
54
Since a lacuna exists in our criminal justice system, it might be argued that
s 5 of the CPC mandates the application of English law. The relevant
provisions are contained in the UK Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984 (c 60) as amended by the UK Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
1994 (c 33). Indeed, Tan Yock Lin, supra, n 1 at para VI [853] says that
the relevance of English statutory provisions cannot be ruled out.
However, public policy must surely militate against the importation of
such a detailed scheme without proper consideration by Parliament. On
this point, see Jack Lee Tsen-Ta, “The Court of Appeal’s Lack of
Jurisdiction to Reopen Appeals” [1994] SJLS 431 at 435-38.
The Police Commissioner is empowered by ss 55 and 56 of the Police
Force Act (Cap 235, 1985 Rev Ed) to make Police General Orders, Force
Orders or Standing Orders which, according to s 57, need not be published
in the Government Gazette.
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Australia,55 Canada,56 Hong Kong,57 New Zealand,58 India59
and the United Kingdom.60 Several of these jurisdictions have
enacted legislation.61 These reports give valuable guidance as to
how our law might be reformed.
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
Australian Law Reform Commission (Cth) (“LRC Australia”), Criminal
Investigation (Report No 2, interim, 1975), New South Wales Law
Reform Commission (“LRC NSW”), Criminal Procedure: Police Powers
of Arrest and Detention (Discussion Paper 16, 1987).
Law Reform Commission of Canada (“LRC Canada”), Criminal Law:
Police powers–Search and Seizure in Criminal Law Enforcement
(Working Paper 30, 1983), Report on Search and Seizure (Report 24,
1984), Investigative Tests (Working Paper 34, 1984), Report on Obtaining
Forensic Evidence: Investigative Procedures in Respect of the Person
(Report 25, 1985).
Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on Arrest (Topic 25,
1992) which generally recommended adoption of provisions of the UK
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee (“CLRC New Zealand”),
Bodily Examination and Samples as a Means of Identification (1979). See
J Hannan, [1980] 4 Crim LJ 210.
Law Commission of India, Thirty-Seventh Report on the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (1967) at 54 paras 183 and 203-08 (Appendix 6), and
Forty-First Report: The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (1969) vol 1 at
37 para 5.1.
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (“RCCP”), Report (Cmnd
8092, 1981).
Australia: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT/NSW), s 353A; Police Administration
Act (NT), s 145; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 259; Police Offences Act
1953 (SA), s 81; Criminal Process (Identification and Search Procedures)
Act 1976 (Tas), ss 6-8; Criminal Code (WA), s 236. India: Indian Code of
Criminal Procedure 1973, ss 53 and 54. United Kingdom: UK Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c 60) (“PACE”), ss 54-55, 62-64, as
amended by the UK Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c 33)
(“CJPO”).
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A. Before Arrest: Search of Persons62
It is submitted that a provision should be inserted into the CPC
stating that all searches of suspects prior to arrest which are
authorised by written law are limited to a frisk of clothing and
personal effects.63 There is no compelling reason to allow the
medical investigation of suspects before arrest as the police have
extensive powers under the CPC and other statutes to arrest
without warrant. For instance, under the CPC suspects may be
apprehended if they are reasonably suspected of having been
concerned in any seizable offence, found taking precautions to
conceal their presence under circumstances which afford reason
to believe that they are taking those precautions with a view to
committing seizable offences, or even if they are unable to give
satisfactory accounts of themselves.64
B. After Arrest: Medical Investigation of Suspects65
The medical procedures that may be performed on suspects may
conveniently be grouped into categories based on the degree of
encroachment into the suspect’s bodily integrity, dignity and
privacy. This allows for safeguards designed to suit each
category to be enacted in the CPC.
62
63
64
65
Canada: LRC Canada (Report 24), supra, n 56 at 33 recommendation 18.
United Kingdom: Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, supra, n 60
at 25-30 paras 3.11-3.28; PACE ss 1-3; Vaughan Bevan & Ken Lidstone,
The Investigation of Crime: A Guide to Police Powers (1991) at 45-80.
United States: Terry v Ohio (1968) 392 US 1; Rolando V del Carmen,
Criminal Procedure: Law and Practice (2nd ed, 1991) at 102-11.
PACE s 2(9); RCCP, supra, n 60 at 30 para 3.27; Bevan & Lidstone, ibid
at 75 para 3.40. Cf the New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Commission
which recommended that the police be allowed to conduct a compulsory
examination of a suspect’s body before arrest. This was heavily criticised
by Hannan, supra, n 58 at 211, 230.
CPC ss 32(l)(a), (g) and (h).
LRC Australia, supra, n 55 at 57 para 131; LRC NSW, supra, n 55 at 115
para 39.
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1. Non-intimate non-intrusive procedures66
Procedures which might be classified as non-intimate and non-
intrusive include (1) visual inspection and palpation of the body
without exposing the genitals or a woman’s breasts, including
the taking of X-rays and other images of the body’s interior; and
the taking of (2) prints from any part of the body; (3) hair
samples other than pubic hair; (4) samples taken from or under
the nails; (5) saliva samples; (6) semen and urine samples
voluntarily produced by the suspect; and (7) samples from any
other part of the body (excluding the body orifices) not
involving puncturing of the skin.
2. Intimate non-intrusive procedures67
Intimate but non-intrusive procedures might include (1) visual
inspection and palpation of the naked body, including seizure of
clothing concealing the genitals or a woman’s breasts; and the
taking of (2) pubic hair samples; (3) samples from any part of
the body (excluding the body orifices) involving puncturing of
the skin, such as blood and tissue samples; and (3) dental and
bite impressions.
3. Intimate intrusive procedures
These procedures are intimate in nature and involve a high
degree of intrusion: (1) the taking of semen samples by rectal
massage of the prostate gland; (2) the taking of urine samples by
catheterisation; (3) with respect to body orifices such as the
mouth, rectum and vagina, searching for and removing
concealed items, and taking samples; and (4) the removal of
objects from the digestive tract by administration of emetics and
enemas, or by stomach-pumping.
66
67
Cf PACE s 65, now amended by CJPO s 58(3).
Cf PACE s 65, now amended by CJPO s 58(2).
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4. Prohibited procedures68
There should be a residual category of procedures which are too
inherently intrusive or of doubtful value. These should not be
permitted under any circumstances. One example could be the
use of surgery under general anaesthesia to remove evidence
embedded in the suspect’s body.
5. General safeguards
As a general rule, procedures should be carried out only with the
suspect’s consent. To encourage suspects to give consent, they
should be told why a particular procedure is being conducted and
how they will participate in it.69 They should be informed,
preferably by a qualified medical practitioner, of any risks in the
procedure so they can properly decide whether or not to consent.
Suspects should be told of their right to refuse to consent to any
procedure, and to withdraw consent at any time. The giving or
withdrawal of consent should be in writing. How a refusal of
consent should be dealt with is discussed below.
Suspects should be entitled to the greatest possible privacy
during procedures, having regard to the nature of the
procedure.70 The number of persons in the examination room
should be kept to the minimum required to ensure the doctor or
nurse’s safety, to prevent the suspect from escaping, and to
avoid allegations of molest. Procedures involving exposure of
the naked body should generally be conducted by persons of the
same sex as the suspect,71 but this should not an absolute
requirement when it would be unduly fastidious to so require (eg
if the test is conducted by a professional medical practitioner).
All procedures should be conducted in a way that ensures
minimum discomfort to the suspect, again having regard to the
68
69
70
71
LRC Canada (Report 25), supra, n 56 at 36-37 recommendation 2.
LRC NSW, supra, n 55 at 119 para 42.
LRC Canada (Report 25), supra, n 56 at 43-44 recommendation 11.
Singapore: CPC s 28(2): “Whenever it is necessary to cause a woman to
be searched the search shall be made by another woman with strict regard
to decency.” There is no reason why this safeguard should be restricted to
females. United Kingdom: PACE s 55(7).
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nature of the procedure and the circumstances. Some procedures
naturally involve more discomfort than others, such as the
removal of objects from the suspect’s body orifices. The degree
of discomfort is also affected by factors such as the extent to
which the suspect co-operates in the procedure.72 If in a doctor’s
opinion any procedure poses a significant risk to the suspect,
having regard to his state of health, it should not be carried
out.73
6. Specific safeguards
Medical investigations should be properly authorised according
to the category they fall into. Non-intimate non-invasive
procedures can be authorised by a junior police officer, eg one
not below the rank of sergeant. On the other hand, intimate non-
invasive procedures should be authorised by a senior police
officer, eg one of at least the rank of superintendent,74 while a
court order should be required for intimate invasive procedures
and other medical investigations not expressly provided for. To
ensure that medical investigations are not used as “fishing
expeditions” or methods of intimidating suspects into giving
confessions, authorisation should only be given if the offence is
a serious one,75 if there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the procedure will provide reliable evidence relating to the
offence that the suspect is charged with, and if there are no less
72
73
74
75
LRC Canada (Report 25), supra, n 56 at 44-45 recommendation 13.
Cf Road Traffic Act, ss 69(1) and 71(2).
PACE ss 55(1), 62(1), 63(3).
These can be laid down by Parliament based on the nature of the offences
and their penalties. The RCCP, supra, n 60 at 24 para 3.7, suggested that
the following offences should be covered: serious offences against the
person (murder, manslaughter, causing grievous bodily harm, armed
robbery, kidnapping, rape), serious offences of damaging property (arson,
causing explosions), serious dishonesty offences (counterfeiting,
corruption, theft and fraud involving large amounts of money), and others
(eg drugs and arms offences).
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intrusive means of obtaining the evidence.76 The suspect should
be told the reasons why authorisation has been given.77
To promote the health and safety of suspects, it is generally
preferable for all medical investigations to be performed by
qualified medical practitioners, ie registered dentists, doctors or
nurses.78 However, all non-intrusive procedures (both non-
intimate and intimate) can safely be conducted by trained police
officers. Intimate intrusive procedures should only be done by
medical practitioners. Again, while it is preferable for all
procedures to be conducted under clinical conditions such as a
sick-bay, clinic or hospital,79 both categories of non-intrusive
procedures may be carried out in other suitable locations such as
a private room in a police station.
It is impossible for an article of this length to suggest all the
possible safeguards which should be in place.80 The legislature,
76
77
78
79
80
Canada: LRC Canada (Report 25), supra, n 56 at 39 recommendation 5.
India: Indian Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 53. New Zealand:
CLRC New Zealand, see Hannan, supra, n 58 at 222. United Kingdom: cf
PACE ss 62(2), 63(4).
PACE, ss 62(5), 63(6).
Australia: LRC NSW, supra, n 55 at 116 para 39, 119 para 42, New
Zealand: CLRC New Zealand, see Hannan, supra, n 58 at 223. United
Kingdom: PACE ss 55(5), 62(9).
United Kingdom: PACE s 55(8). In Huguez v United States (1968) 406 F
2d 366 at 381-82, the court condemned the brutal and painful rectal
examination of defendant in the non-antiseptic, non-hygienic surroundings
of a border baggage room. Cf Reynen v Antonenko, supra, n 41, where
rectal examination of defendant in a hospital of high standards by an
eminently qualified medical practitioner was held to be reasonable.
For instance, other safeguards might include (1) empowering the police to
require a suspect who has been charged but is no longer in police custody
(eg out on bail) to report back for medical investigations if none were
carried out during custody, or if body samples taken were insufficient or
unsuitable: PACE ss 62(1A), 63(3A), 63(4), as inserted by CJPO ss
54-56; (2) allowing suspects a portion of any sample for independent
testing: LRC Canada (Working Paper 34), supra, n 56 at 67 para (7); and
(3) the destruction in the suspect’s presence of all samples taken from him
and all documents relating to tests done on the samples, if he is
subsequently acquitted at trial or if the prosecution drops all the charges
against him: PACE s 64.
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in framing a comprehensive code, will no doubt have to draw
upon the experiences of other jurisdictions. However, it is
submitted that the safeguards proposed above are minimum
requirements which should be present in the CPC.
C. Making the Law Effective
1. Ensuring compliance by the suspect:
What should be done if a suspect refuses to consent to a medical
procedure? Three possible methods, applied singly or in
combination, have been used by legislatures:81
(1)
(2)
(3)
The suspect can be charged with obstructing a police officer
in the discharge of his or her duty,82 or non-compliance can
be made a specific criminal offence.83
The use of reasonable force can be sanctioned.
The court can be permitted to draw adverse inferences as
appear proper from the suspect’s behaviour.
Method (1) is useless where serious offences are concerned.
Suspects would in effect be able to choose the offence under
which they would be dealt with–the crime itself, or a lesser
offence of non-compliance or obstruction of the police.84 We
could provide a disincentive by punishing refusal to co-operate
with the same maximum penalty as the substantive offence, but
this is only feasible for minor offences like traffic violations.85
For instance, it would be completely out of proportion to punish
even a manifestly unreasonable refusal to furnish a blood sample
81
82
83
84
85
LRC Canada (Working Paper 34), supra, n 56 at 70.
Penal Code, s 186.
Eg Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 1985 Rev Ed), s 31(2), where refusal
to undergo a urine test results in a maximum fine of $5,000.
CLRC New Zealand, supra, n 58 at 21 para 50.
Eg Section 69(2) of the Road Traffic Act punishes refusal to provide a
blood or urine specimen without reasonable excuse with the same
punishment as drunk driving offences.
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with the severe penalty of death attaching to the offence of
murder.86
On the other hand, method (2) which allows the use offeree on
suspects has been criticised as ineffective since it is very
difficult to properly conduct a procedure on a person determined
to resist,87 and inherently objectionable because it may amount
to physical intimidation.88 However, given that serious offences
are involved here, it is doubtful that any other method of
enforcement would be effective.89
It is submitted that the best compromise is to allow the police
to use reasonable force to carry out investigative procedures, but
to require them to first obtain a court order authorising the use of
such force. A judge or registrar would have to decide whether it
is in the best interests of justice to compel the suspect to undergo
the procedure. In cases where a delay may mean loss of
evidence, a senior police officer can be allowed to authorise the
use of force. However, to ensure the suspect’s safety, if the
procedure poses a significant health risk to the suspect if he or
she resists (eg a body orifice search), then it should not be done.
Instead, the trial court should be allowed to apply method (3)
and draw proper inferences from the suspect’s non-compliance
to corroborate evidence tending to suggest that something
incriminating would have been found, had the procedure been
carried out.90
86
87
88
89
90
RCCP, supra, n 60 at 68 para 3.136.
Ibid at 67 para 3.135.
LRC Canada (Working Paper 34), supra, n 56 at 71. See also the strong
objections by Feldman, supra, n 9 at 240 para 9.34.
Ibid at 87 recommendation 12 (later omitted from Report 25).
PACE s 62(10); Feldman, supra, n 9 at 240 para 9.33.
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2. Ensuring compliance by the police: exclusion of illegally-
obtained evidence :9l
There is little point having rules regulating medical
investigations if police officers can breach them with impunity.
But according to section 5 of the Evidence Act,92 evidence is
admissible as long as it is declared to be relevant by the Act. No
section permits evidence to be excluded simply because it has
been obtained by the police in breach of the law. Nevertheless,
the courts have repeatedly declared that they retain a residual
discretion to exclude illegally-obtained evidence in certain
circumstances.
At the outset, there is doubt over the source of this discretion.
Tan Yock Lin93 speculates that the exclusionary discretion is
built into certain sections of the Act, such as section 9 dealing
with the relevancy of facts which support or rebut an inference
suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or sections 14 and
15 which deal with similar fact evidence. Another theory states
that since the discretion is a common law principle consistent
with the Evidence Act it is applicable under section 2(2).94 This,
however, does not account for section 138(1) of the Act: “When
either party proposes to give evidence of any fact, the court may
ask the party proposing to give the evidence in what manner the
alleged fact, if proved, would be relevant; and the court shall
91
92
93
94
See generally Feldman, supra, n 9 at 417-30; LRC Australia, supra, n 55
at 136-42; L Taman, “Judicial Approaches to Entrapment” (1981) 23 Mal
LR 286; Meng Hong Yeo, “The Discretion to Exclude Illegally and
Improperly Obtained Evidence: A Choice of Approaches” (1981) Melb
ULR 31; Jeffrey Pinsler, “The Discretion to Exclude Illegally or
Improperly Obtained Evidence in Criminal Cases” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 252;
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admit the evidence if it thinks that the fact, if proved, would be
relevant, and not otherwise.” The word shall suggests that the
court has no choice but to admit evidence which it determines to
be relevant, thus precluding the application of a common law
discretion. Perhaps this is one of those awkward situations where
the maxim communis error jus facit–a common mistake
sometimes makes law–must come into play. The discretion is
already too entrenched to be questioned. The following comment
was made in the recent decision Chan Chi Pun v PP:95
[E]vidence unlawfully obtained, once relevant, is in law
admissible, and the court [will] only exercise its judicial
discretion to exclude it if its reception would operate unfairly
against the accused... We did not think this principle of law to
be in doubt, and, indeed, counsel did not seek to query it.
The fact that the discretion sits uncomfortably with present
provisions of the Act is one of the reasons why a new provision
should be inserted into the Act.
Even though the cases recognise that a judicial discretion
exists, they disagree over how it should be applied. Two
approaches are evident. In Cheng Swee Tiang v PP,96 a majority
of the Court of Criminal Appeal asserted: “It is undisputed law...
that while evidence unlawfully obtained is admissible, if
relevant, there is a judicial discretion to disallow such evidence,
if its reception would operate unfairly against an accused.”97
The court felt that in the exercise of this discretion a judge must
consider the conflict between two important interests: on the one
hand, there is the individual’s interest in being protected from
illegal invasions of his or her liberties by the authorities; on the
other, the State’s interest in ensuring that evidence related to the
crime which is necessary to enable justice to be done should not
be withheld from the courts on any merely technical ground.98 It
is clear the court envisaged that the discretion might be
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[1994] 2 SLR 61 at 65D (CCA).
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exercised to protect the accused from illegal invasions of his
liberties by the authorities.99
The other approach is that of the House of Lords in R v
Sang,100 which has been applied in Singapore by Ajmer Singh v
PP,101 How Poh Sun v PP102 and Lai Kim Loy v PP.103 In Sang,
Lord Diplock held that a court has the discretion to exclude (1)
admissible evidence which would probably have a prejudicial
influence upon the minds of the jury that would be out of
proportion to its true evidential value, and (2) evidence
tantamount to a self-incriminating admission which was
obtained from the defendant, after the offence had been
committed, by means which would justify a judge in excluding
an actual confession which had the like self-incriminating
effect.104 Sang is narrower than Cheng Swee Tiang because the
court’s discretion is limited to ensuring that it is fair to use the
evidence brought against the accused at the trial:
It is no part of a judge’s function to exercise disciplinary
powers over the police or prosecution as respects the way in
which evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by them. If it
was obtained illegally there will be a remedy in civil law; if it
was obtained legally but in breach of the rules of conduct for
the police, this is a matter for the appropriate disciplinary
authority to deal with. What the judge at the trial is concerned
with is not how the evidence sought to be adduced by the
prosecution has been obtained, but with how it is to be used by
the prosecution at the trial.105
The sole function of a criminal trial is seen as determining the
truth of the charge against the accused. It is deemed harmful to
99
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the public interest if a guilty person is acquitted just to chastise
the police, and unfair to cast suspicion on a police officer in a
trial neither equipped nor intended as a full inquiry into his or
her conduct.106
It is possible that the broader approach in Cheng Swee Tiang
results from a misapplication of Lord Goddard’s dicta in
Kuruma v R:107 “No doubt in a criminal case the judge always
has a discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules of
admissibility would operate unfairly against an accused.” In
Sang, Lord Diplock clarified that Lord Goddard meant nothing
more than unfairness at trial.108 But not only has Cheng Swee
Tiang never been overruled,109 it appears to be favoured today.
Between 1987 and 1994 Singapore courts routinely applied
Sang, but recent cases such as Chan Chi Pun v PP110 and PP v
Sng Siew Ngoh111 have cited only Cheng Swee Tiang. This may
signal a retreat from Sang. It may be that the court is reserving to
itself a discretion to exclude evidence obtained by the police in
flagrant breach of the rules. In any case, the tussle between
Cheng Swee Tiang and Sang is another reason why a new form
of discretion needs to be enacted into the Evidence Act.
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broad and flexible judicial discretion while the Sang approach is clearly
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A further reason is that neither approach gives proper weight to
the “judicial integrity principle”. Zuckerman112 argues
convincingly that the best justification for the judicial discretion
is that it exists to protect the administration of justice from being
brought into disrepute. But as the law stands, illegally-obtained
evidence is not likely to be excluded either under the Cheng
Swee Tiang or the Sang approach. Sang clearly emphasises that
it is not the business of judges to control the police; hence,
illegally-obtained evidence is admissible unless it falls within
the narrow exceptions to the rule. Even in Cheng Swee Tiang,
where protection of individual rights was purportedly balanced
against society’s interests in fighting crime, the court came down
heavily in favour of the latter. It held that illegally-obtained
evidence will only be excluded if its admission is likely to cause
“substantially incontestable” harm to the public.113 These
approaches are perilous because ordinary people in the street are
likely to feel that the courts are biased towards the police:
[H]owever strongly judges may try to dissociate propriety
from admissibility, the reception of improperly obtained
evidence is inevitably perceived as condonation. The judiciary
may be seen as being hypocritical in punishing the suspect of
crime but excusing the police of theirs. This severely weakens
the integrity of the judiciary and the moral strength of its
judgments.114
Lastly, amending the Evidence Act is desirable because the
present exclusionary discretion places too much faith in current
methods of dealing with police lapses. In theory, suspects who
have had medical tests conducted on them in contravention of
the law may sue the police in tort for assault and battery or
breach of statutory duty, rely on the criminal law, or complain to
police authorities115 so that disciplinary action can be taken.
112
113
114
115
AAS Zuckertnan, “Improperly Obtained Evidence” in The Principles of
Criminal Evidence (1989) 343 at 350–52.
Supra, n 94 at 293 col ID.
Hor, supra, n 94 at Iviii.
According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, an accused person in police
custody can complain of ill-treatment at any time. The police officer who
17 Sing LR Medical Investigation of Suspects 85
Such remedies are often illusory. Although it is technically
possible for accused persons to obtain substantial damages in
tort even though no physical injury has been caused,116 legal
costs are discouraging. Also, as Michael Hor points out, “It is
entirely against basic human psychology for the person
aggrieved to muster enough determination to pursue these
matters himself. The natural reaction would be to stay as far
away as possible from the police and the courts. Embarking on a
civil claim or a disciplinary or criminal complaint is potentially
time consuming and emotionally taxing.”117 Where criminal
prosecutions are concerned, the Public Prosecutor may exercise
his discretion not to institute a prosecution.118 Even if the
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accused takes out a private summons, it has been suggested that
such proceedings may be impeded by the tendency of the police
to protect “one of their own” and by the possibility that their
conduct may be consistent with normal departmental practice.119
A Canadian study has shown that few aggrieved persons lodge
complaints with police authorities because they either do not
know how to do so, fear police retaliation, or feel that to
complain would be ineffective as wrongdoing would be covered
up.120 These fears may well be unfounded; however, a criminal
justice system which seems to unduly favour the police does
nothing to correct public misconceptions. Justice should not only
be done but should manifestly and clearly be seen to be done.
A proposal by the Australian Law Reform Commission,121
based on Scottish and Irish law, has much to commend it. The
Commission suggested that any evidence obtained in contraven-
tion of any law should be inadmissible unless the court decides
in the exercise of its discretion that its admission would
specifically and substantially benefit the public interest without
unduly derogating from the rights and liberties of any individual.
We might add an overriding test: that the administration of
justice must not be brought into disrepute.122 The burden of
satisfying the court that illegally-obtained evidence should be
admitted should rest with the prosecution. The court can
consider factors such as (1) how serious the crime is; (2) how
urgent or difficult it is to detect the crime and to preserve real
evidence of it; (3) whether the misconduct was serious, trivial or
accidental; (4) whether the illegality harmed the suspect or
119
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affected the reliability of the evidence; and (5) how easy it
would have been to comply with the law.123
Placing such an inclusionary discretion in the Evidence Act
would give the court flexibility to admit reliable evidence where
appropriate while emphasising that it disapproves of indifference
towards procedural safeguards. The court’s scrutiny of police
practices would uphold its impartiality by demonstrating to the
public that the police are not above the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Criminal Procedure Code purports to be comprehensive, but
falls short of its target. It does not regulate the use of new
technology for analysing evidence which impinges on the bodily
integrity, dignity and privacy of suspects. It is submitted that
legislative safeguards need to be built into our criminal
procedure to protect individual interests while not unduly
impeding the police. Certain procedures deemed too invasive
should be prohibited, while others should be allowed if
performed by qualified persons under conditions respectful of
health risks, hygiene and privacy. The use of force should be
carefully regulated. Above all, to ensure that these new
safeguards are not mere window-dressing, the Evidence Act
should be amended to exclude evidence tainted by illegality
unless the exercise of judicial discretion to admit it does not
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
The law inevitably lags behind current developments, but
through inaction we have given science too much of a headway.
This outdated area of the law requires urgent legislative
correction if it is not to be overwhelmed by new scientific
techniques. Given that individuals’ interests are at risk, it is
hoped that the wait will not be too long.
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